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Analyzing a Municipality's Authority to Enact the
Model Ordinance for Wind Energy Facilities in
Pennsylvania
INTRODUCTION
On November 30, 2004, Pennsylvania Governor Edward G.
Rendell signed Act 213 of 2004 into law.1 Act 213, known as the
Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act (the "Act"), obligates
electric generation and distribution companies to generate a cer-
tain amount of electricity that they sell to retail customers in
Pennsylvania from environmentally beneficial sources. 2 Specifi-
cally, the Act provides a fifteen-year schedule, requiring that an
increasing percentage of electricity come from alternative energy
resources. 3 Energy derived from wind power is noted in the Act as
a possible source of alternative energy. 4 The wind energy indus-
try in Pennsylvania may experience substantial growth as a result
of the Act.
Recognizing the potential for an increase in wind energy facili-
ties, otherwise known as wind farms, and the benefit to uniform
regulation of these facilities, Governor Rendell unveiled the Model
Ordinance for Wind Energy Facilities in Pennsylvania (the 'Model
Wind Ordinance") in April of 2006.5 Drafted through a collabora-
tive effort of state and local governments and organizations repre-
senting the private sector, the Model Wind Ordinance serves as a
template that local governments can adopt in whole, or in part,
based on their specific needs. 6 The Model Wind Ordinance is de-
signed to guide local governments in regulating wind farms within
their municipal borders by addressing issues including: permit-
ting, visual appearance, sound levels, shadow flicker, setbacks,
1. 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1648 (West 2006).
2. 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1648.
3. Id.
4. 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1648.2.
5. PA Power Port, Governor Rendell Unveils Model Ordinance to Help Local Govern-
ments, Wind Energy Developers (Apr. 24, 2006),
http://www.state.pa.us/papower/cwp/view.asp?A=11&Q=452084. See Model Ordinance for
Wind Energy Facilities in Pennsylvania (Mar. 21, 2006),
http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/energy/lib/energy/mso3AD.pdf.
6. See PA Power Port, supra note 5.
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interference with communications devices, protection of public
roads, decommissioning, liability insurance and dispute resolu-
tion.
7
This comment discusses the various approaches that a munici-
pality can take in order to adopt an ordinance that regulates wind
farms. Specifically, this comment discusses whether a municipal-
ity can adopt the Model Wind Ordinance, in whole or in part,
through a zoning ordinance, a subdivision and land use ordinance,
or the municipality's general police powers.
REGULATING WIND FARMS THROUGH A ZONING ORDINANCE
Wind farms can likely be regulated by adopting the Model Wind
Ordinance, or similar regulations, through a zoning ordinance.
The Municipalities Planning Code (MPG) confers the power to en-
act zoning ordinances on municipalities generally.8 Under the
MPC, zoning ordinances may:
permit, prohibit, regulate, restrict and determine: ... (2) Size,
height, bulk, location, erection, construction, repair, mainte-
nance, alteration, razing, removal and use of structures. (3)
Areas and dimensions of land and bodies of water to be occu-
pied by uses and structures, as well as areas, courts, yards,
and other open spaces and distances to be left unoccupied by
uses and structures. 9
Consequently, municipalities have wide-ranging powers to control
the use of their land through zoning ordinances. The regulations
enumerated in the Model Wind Ordinance would presumably fall
within the broad zoning powers that the MPC confers upon mu-
nicipalities. Nevertheless, the usual zoning limitations would still
apply. For example, and perhaps most notably, any zoning ordi-
nance that regulates wind farms cannot be exclusionary. 10
Pennsylvania law presumes that zoning ordinances are valid
and constitutional; however, this presumption can be overcome by
proof that the ordinance totally excludes an otherwise legitimate
7. Id.
8. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 10101-11202 (West 2005).
9. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10603(b).
10. See In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718, 728 (Pa. 2003) ("[a
zoning] ordinance will be found to be unreasonable and not substantially related to a police
power purpose if it is shown to be unduly restrictive or exclusionary").
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use." Exclusionary ordinances can either be de jure, meaning the
ordinance, on its face, totally bans a legitimate use, or de facto,
meaning the ordinance allows a use on its face, but when applied,
it prohibits the use throughout the municipality.12 Pennsylvania
law places a heavy burden on the party challenging an ordinance
as exclusionary. 13 This substantial burden was illustrated in APT
Pittsburgh, Ltd. Partnership v. Pennsylvania Township Butler
County. 14
In APT Pittsburgh, APT Pittsburgh ("APT") sought to build a
communications tower in Penn Township. 15 In order for the com-
munications tower to be effective, the tower had to be constructed
on elevated and unobstructed grounds.16 Soon after APT chose a
suitable area, Penn Township amended its zoning regime to re-
strict communications towers to light industrial districts. 17 APT
argued that the ordinance was exclusionary because a majority of
the light industrial district land, due to its low elevation, was not
technologically feasible for constructing communications towers,
and the remaining land was unavailable because its owners would
not permit APT to construct its tower on their land. '8
The APT Pittsburgh court noted that "[t]o succeed on its exclu-
sionary zoning claim before the [Zoning Hearing Board], APT had
to prove that no telecommunications provider, including itself,
could build a functional tower in any of the [permissible zones]."'19
The court was unsympathetic to APT's need to locate its tower on
highly elevated land, which constituted only a small portion of the
permissible zones. 20 The majority ruled that APT did not provide
sufficient evidence demonstrating that other wireless providers
would be unable to construct beneficial communications towers in
the permissible areas. 2' Also, the Third Circuit found insufficient
11. See, e.g., APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P'shp. v. Penn Twp. Butler County, 196 F.3d 469 (3rd
Cir. 1999) (citing Benham v. Bd. of Supervisors of Middletown Twp., 349 A.2d 484, 487 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975)).
12. APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 475.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 471.
16. Id. at 472.
17. APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 472.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 477.
21. Id. "Pennsylvania's rule against exclusionary zoning does not impose upon a town-
ship the duty to assure that all providers, regardless of the systems they have chosen to
construct, will have a suitable site for a functioning tower within the township." Id. (em-
phasis added).
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evidence demonstrating that APT could not feasibly lease ele-
vated, unobstructed land from the current light industrial district
land owners.
22
The facts in APT Pittsburgh resemble potential wind farm
situations. Like the communication towers in APT Pittsburgh,
wind farms would need to be located in highly elevated, unob-
structed areas. According to APT Pittsburgh, assuming wind
farms can be regulated through zoning (which is likely), a zoning
ordinance may not be considered exclusionary even if it limits the
areas in which wind farms can be located to areas that are con-
trolled by owners who are unwilling to lease their property for
wind farms and/or areas that would be mostly unsuitable for wind
farms (e.g. a valley). If a potential wind farm operator challenges
a zoning ordinance as exclusionary, the challenger would have the
substantial burden of proving that no party could build a success-
ful wind farm on any conforming lands and that all sufficient, con-
forming land is economically unfeasible. Such a burden of proof
would prove to be extremely arduous.
REGULATING WIND FARMS THROUGH A SUBDIVISION AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE
Municipalities have the power to regulate subdivisions and land
developed within their borders by enacting subdivision ordi-
nances. 23 If the construction of a wind farm is considered a "land
development," municipalities can regulate wind farms through a
wind farm-specific subdivision ordinance. A "land development"
includes any of the following:
(1) The improvement of one lot or two or more contiguous
lots, tracts or parcels of land for any purpose involving:
(i) a group of two or more residential or nonresidential build-
ings, whether proposed initially or cumulatively, or a single
nonresidential building on a lot or lots regardless of the num-
ber of occupants or tenure; or
(ii) the division or allocation of land or space, whether ini-
tially or cumulatively, between or among two or more existing
or prospective occupants by means of, or for the purpose of
22. APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 477.
23. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10501 (West 2005).
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streets, common areas, leaseholds, condominiums, buildings
or other features .... 24
Pennsylvania case law indicates that leasing land to construct a
wind farm would fall within the statutory definition of "land de-
velopment."
Tu- Way Tower Co. v. Zoning Hearing Board25 concerned a com-
pany, Tu-Way Tower Co. ("Tu-Way"), that owned a 200-foot com-
munications tower located on its property. 26 Tu-Way sought to
extend the tower and add two additional towers with accessory
buildings. 27 In determining whether this construction would con-
stitute a land development, the court noted:
[t]he fact that Tu-Way wishes to construct buildings accessory
to its proposed towers does not raise its proposal to a level of
land development. Tu-Way did not come before the Board to
develop its land with residential or commercial buildings, but
rather, to extend a tower or erect additional towers, activities
which are not defined as land development under the MPC.
28
Additionally, the proposed construction was not a "land develop-
ment" as defined by the MPC because Tu-Way owned the land on
which it sought to construct its additional towers, and therefore,
Tu-Way was not proposing the division or redivision of a piece of
land. 29
Similarly, in Marshall Township Board of Supervisors v. Mar-
shall Township Zoning Hearing Board,30 the court held that re-
placing a 100-foot lamp pole with a 150-foot pole with an antennae
and equipment cabinets did not fall within in the MPC's definition
of "land development." 31 In Marshall, the Postal Service leased a
parking lot to National Wireless Infrastructure, L.P. ("Unisite").32
Unisite then subleased capacity to American Portable Telecom
("APT"), allowing APT to replace one of the lamp poles with a lar-
ger pole that had an antennae and equipment cabinets. 33 Apply-
24. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10107 (West 2005) (emphasis added).
25. 688 A.2d 744 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
26. Tu- Way Tower, 688 A.2d at 744.
27. Id. at 745.
28. Id. at 747.
29. Id. See also Upper Southampton Twp. v. Upper Southampton Twp. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 885 A.2d 85, 91 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
30. 717 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
31. Marshall Twp., 717 A.2d. at 6.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id.
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ing the same rationale as the Tu-Way court, the Marshall court
held that Unisite's constructions did not constitute a "land devel-
opment."34 Thus, "merely adding antennae and 50 feet to a 100
foot tower likewise does not constitute 'land development' within
the meaning of the MPC. '3 5 Any allocation or subdivision of land
occurred when the Postal Service leased its land to Unisite, not
when Unisite entered into its sublease agreement with APT. 
3 6
The court in White v. Township of Upper St. Clair addressed a
situation that appears to be analogous to what a typical wind farm
agreement would entail. 37  There, Crown Communications
("Crown") entered into a lease agreement with Upper St. Clair
Township, whereby Crown leased land to erect a communications
tower, three adjoining buildings, an eight-foot-high fence, and a
road providing access to the tower.38 In holding that the lease
agreement created a land development, the court noted that the
lease, which conveyed the use of a discrete parcel of land from the
Township to Crown for up to 100 years, divided a 200-acre parcel
that was owned by the Township into a .428-acre lot on which
Crown would construct its tower. 39 Thus, the land was being di-
vided between two parties by a lease for a new use (i.e. housing a
communication tower).
Similarly, the court in Upper Southampton Township v. Upper
Southampton Township Zoning Hearing Board40 held that an
agreement that allows a party to construct a billboard on a prop-
erty owner's land falls within the MPC's definition of "land devel-
opment," even if the agreement does not specify the exact location
of the billboards. 41 The court held that the amount of land and
size of a structure is irrelevant to land development jurispru-
dence. 42 The agreements in Upper Southampton allocated land
between two occupants for a new use, the construction and place-
ment of billboards, which clearly constitutes an improvement of
one tract of land involving the division of land between two occu-
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id. at 14.
36. See Upper Southampton Twp. v. Upper Southampton Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 885
A.2d 85, 91 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).
37. White v. Twp. of Upper St. Clair, 799 A.2d 188 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
38. White, 799 A.2d at 191.
39. Id. at 202.
40. Upper Southampton, 885 A.2d at 91.
41. Id. at 92.
42. Id.
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pants by means of a lease.43 Therefore, the agreement constituted
a land development.
Based on the foregoing cases, a municipality could regulate
wind farms through a subdivision and land development ordi-
nance if the wind farm owner or operator enters into a lease
agreement to construct a wind farm on someone else's property, as
the lease would allocate the land between its original use and its
proposed expanded use as a wind farm, constituting a "land devel-
opment."44 However, the preceding analysis is subject to change
because on April 4, 2006, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted Allowance of Appeal in Upper Southampton on the issue
of whether the billboards fall within the definition of "land devel-
opment. ' 45 No opinion has been rendered as of the date of this
comment.
REGULATING WIND FARMS THROUGH POLICE POWERS
Not all Pennsylvania municipalities have zoning ordinances.
Nevertheless, these municipalities may still be able to enact the
Model Wind Ordinance, in whole or in part, through the munici-
pality's applicable code under its police powers. The following
analysis examines First and Second Class Townships and the
scope of their police powers.
46
The Second Class Township Code empowers Second Class
Townships to enact ordinances "necessary for the proper manage-
ment, care and control of the township and its finances and the
43. Id. at 88.
44. Tu-Way Tower, 688 A.2d at 744. See also Upper Southampton, 885 A.2d at 91;
Lehigh Asphalt Paving & Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 830 A.2d 1063, 1071 (Pa.
Commw. Ct 2003) ("Lehigh Asphalt's plans contemplate the allocation of land between the
existing single-family residential use and the proposed expansion of the quarry use. Thus,
the plans propose 'land development'....").
45. Upper Southampton Twp. v. Upper Southampton Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 895
A.2d 1265 (Pa. 2006).
46. In Pennsylvania, a municipality's class depends on its population. To qualify as a
First Class Township, a municipality must have a population density of at least three hun-
dred people per square mile. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 55201 (West 2006), providing:
The townships now in existence and those to be hereafter created are divided
into two classes. Townships of the first class shall be those having a population
of at least three hundred inhabitants to the square mile, which have heretofore
fully organized and elected their officers and are now functioning as townships
of the first class, or which may hereafter be created townships of the first class
in the manner provided in this act. All townships, not townships of the first
class, shall be townships of the second class. A change from one class to the
other shall hereafter be made only as provided by this act or the laws relating
to townships of the second class.
53 PA STAT. ANN. § 55201.
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maintenance of peace, good government, health and welfare of the
township and its citizens, trade, commerce and manufacturers."
47
Also, Second Class Townships can enact ordinances "to secure the
safety of persons or property within the township" and to prohibit
nuisances.
48
Likewise, the First Class Township Code provides for adoption
of all ordinances "necessary for the proper management, care and
control of the township and its finances, and the maintenance of
peace, good government and welfare of the township" as well as
any regulations "necessary for the health, safety, morals, general
welfare, cleanliness, beauty, convenience and comfort of the town-
ship and the inhabitants thereof."
4 9
Pennsylvania case law indicates that a municipality without a
zoning ordinance can likely enact, in whole or in part, the Model
Wind Ordinance, through its applicable code. For instance, in A
Construction Corp. v. Bradford,50 Bradford Township enacted an
ordinance that regulated waste pursuant to the police powers enu-
merated under the Second Class Township Code. 51 IA Construc-
tion Corporation ("IA") argued that the ordinance was a de facto
zoning ordinance because several of its provisions contained land
use and zoning principles and, therefore, was invalid since it was
not enacted pursuant to the MPC. 52 The waste ordinance con-
tained setback requirements, requirements that waste activity be
at least three miles from ground water, and requirements that
vehicles hauling waste use roads at least 900 feet outside of the
township.
53
The LA court held that the waste ordinance was not a zoning or-
dinance, noting that "setbacks are not exclusively hallmarks of
zoning." 54 Also, the ordinance did not concern common zoning
elements such as determining the "uses of land, dimensions of
structures, areas of land to be occupied, and density of popula-
tion."55 Likewise, the ordinance addressed few, if any, common
zoning purposes, including "the regulation of population growth,
the preservation of land for all forms of residential housing, the
47. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 66506 (West 2005).
48. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 66527, 66529 (West 2005).
49. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 56544, 56552 (West 2005).
50. 598 A.2d 1347 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
51. IA, 598 A.2d at 1348.
52. Id.
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regulation of commercial growth, the preservation of historic, sce-
nic and natural areas, and the creation of different types of dis-
tricts."56 The court concluded that the ordinance was not a de
facto zoning ordinance, as its overall purpose was to regulate solid
waste activity, and none of the sections of the ordinance exceed
the scope of that goal. 57 Accordingly, the court held the ordinance
was a valid exercise of Bradford Township's police powers. 58
Similarly, in Land Acquisition Services, Inc. v. Clarion County
Board of Commissioners,59 Clarion County, which has no zoning
ordinance, enacted an ordinance regulating hazardous waste ac-
tivities.60 Specifically, the ordinance designated certain zones as
waste sites, established setback requirements, required fences
around waste sites, and required that waste site proposal plans be
submitted to the commission. 61 Land Acquisition Services argued
that the waste ordinance contained zoning characteristics that
relate to the use of land as well as the operational aspects of a
hazardous waste facility, constituting a zoning ordinance. 62
The Land Acquisition court recognized that the ordinance had
components that are often used in zoning and land use legislation,
but held that these components were not "exclusive hallmarks of
zoning."63 The court concluded that because the ordinance's pri-
mary purpose was to regulate hazardous waste disposal activity
and because the ordinance did not exceed the terms of this goal,
the ordinance was not a zoning ordinance. 64
The Model Wind Ordinance concerns issues including permit-
ting, visual appearance, sound levels, shadow flicker, setbacks,
interference with communications devices, protection of public
roads, decommissioning, liability insurance and dispute resolu-
tion. These components, like the components of the ordinances in
IA and Land Acquisition, are not exclusive features of zoning.
Furthermore, the Model Wind Ordinance's primary objective is
not to regulate land use. Rather, as noted in the Model Wind Or-
dinance's "Purpose" section, the Ordinance seeks to "provide for
the construction and operation of Wind Energy Facilities . . . sub-
56. IA, 598 A.2d at 1350.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1351.
59. 605 A.2d 465 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
60. Land Acquisition, 605 A.2d. at 466.
61. Id. at 469.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 470.
64. Id.
Duquesne Law Review
ject to reasonable conditions that will protect the public health,
safety and welfare. '65 It is probable that the Model Wind Ordi-
nance would be held to not exceed its goal of regulating wind farm
activity.
A cursory reading of LA and Land Acquisition might support the
proposition that a municipality can incontestably enact the Model
Wind Ordinance, in whole or in part, without a zoning ordinance.
However, there is a key distinction between the LA and Land De-
velopment ordinances and the Model Wind Ordinance. The ordi-
nances in LA and Land Acquisition were both enacted pursuant to
police powers and both sought to regulate waste activities. The
Second Class Township Code has a specific provision dealing with
the "[a]ccumulation of ashes, garbage, solid waste and refuse ma-
terials."66 This section empowers municipalities to prohibit accu-
mulations of these materials and to collect fees for their collection,
removal and disposal. Likewise, the First Class Township has a
similar provision. 67 No analogous provision exists in either town-
ship code that specifically empowers municipalities to regulate
wind farms. Therefore, municipalities would need to have the
power to enact this wind farm-specific ordinance through their
broad police powers in order to regulate wind farms without a zon-
ing or subdivision ordinance. Taylor v. Harmony Township Board
of Commissioners68 addressed a similar situation.
69
In Taylor, Harmony Township, a First Class Township, pursu-
ant to its police powers, enacted an ordinance prohibiting timber
harvesting in areas determined to be landslide-prone or flood-
prone.70 Robert Taylor was cited for operating a logging business
on landslide-prone land without a permit, in violation of the ordi-
nance. 71 Taylor argued that the ordinance was invalid because
the general police power provisions of the First Class Township
Code do not specifically authorize the Township to regulate log-
ging or timber harvesting. 72
The court noted that the First Class Township Code has several
provisions that provide for broad police powers, allowing munici-
65. Model Ordinance for Wind Energy Facilities in Pennsylvania (Mar. 21, 2006),
http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/energy/lib/energy/mso3AD.pdf.
66. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 67101 (West 2005).
67. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56527 (West 2005).
68. 851 A.2d 1020 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
69. Taylor, 851 A.2d at 1020.
70. Id. at 1022.
71. Id. at 1022-23.
72. Id. at 1024.
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palities to enact legislation aimed at protecting its citizens' health,
safety, and welfare. 73 The court held that the ordinance was a
valid use of the Township's police powers, as the ordinance was
enacted to "prevent harm to the public welfare caused by land-
slides and storm water runoff."74 Furthermore, the court noted:
[the ordinance] is a valid exercise of the Township's power be-
cause it seeks to minimize floods, landslides, and dangerous
stormwater runoff; it seeks to prevent damage to roads, dam-
age to drains, damage to public utilities, damage to water-
courses, fire hazards, and reduction in property value; and it
seeks to enhance the natural beauty and environment within
the Harmony Township. All these aims fall squarely within
the general police power provisions of the [First Class Town-
ship Code] .... 75
Similarly, the Model Wind Ordinance seeks to minimize safety
hazards associated with wind farms, prevent damage to roads,
prevent reduction in property value, and maintain the natural
beauty and environment within the municipality. Like the goals
in the Taylor ordinance, these aims seem to fall squarely within a
municipality's general police powers, which should allow a mu-
nicipality to regulate wind farms through means other than a zon-
ing ordinance.
CONCLUSION
Municipalities have various effective options for regulating wind
farms within their borders. Because the MPC provides Pennsyl-
vania's municipalities with broad powers to control land use, regu-
lating wind farms through a zoning ordinance appears to be most
effective and least susceptible to attack. Thus, a municipality
could likely enact the Model Wind Ordinance, or similar regula-
tions, through its zoning ordinance. However, not every munici-
pality in Pennsylvania has a zoning ordinance.
In certain situations, municipalities can regulate wind farms
through a subdivision ordinance. If the wind farm is constructed
on leased land, the construction would likely constitute a "land
development" that can be regulated by a subdivision ordinance
73. Id.
74. Taylor, 851 A.2d at 1025.
75. Id.
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because the lease would allocate the land between its use prior to
the construction of the wind farm and its new use as a wind farm.
Here, municipalities could likely adopt a subdivision ordinance
that mirrors the Model Wind Ordinance's language.
Finally, municipalities can likely enact at least a significant
portion of the Model Wind Ordinance through police powers. Mu-
nicipalities have broad police powers, allowing them to enact legis-
lation protecting their citizens' health, safety and welfare. It is
likely that a court would determine that most, if not all, of the
Model Wind Ordinance is aimed at protecting the public health,
safety and welfare and, therefore, can be enacted through a mu-
nicipality's general police powers.
Mark K Dausch
